How Hierarchical Structures Impact on Competition by Alexsandr Galegov & Andrey Garnaev
AUCO Czech Economic Review 2 (2008) 227–236
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Oeconomica
Received 29 September 2008; Accepted 4 December 2008
How Hierarchical Structures Impact on Competition
Alexsandr Galegov∗, Andrey Garnaev†
Abstract Stackelberg models for hierarchical oligopolistic markets with a homogenous product
were studied by researchers extensively. The goal of this paper is to extend the classical solution
in closed form of the Stackelberg model for a general hierarchical structures composed by ﬁrms
arranged into groups of different hierarchical levels.
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1. Introduction
Stackelberg models for hierarchical oligopolistic markets with a homogenous pro-
duct were studied by researchers extensively. Mainly two types of the models were
considered. One is a hierarchical Stackelberg game in which each ﬁrm chooses its
output at a stage sequentially. This is formulated as a multi-stage game. The other is
a standard two stage game in which multiple leaders choose outputs simultaneously
and independently at ﬁrst, and multiple followers decide outputs simultaneously and
independently later, given the leader’s total output.
Several researchers have tackled to investigate the existence and uniqueness of the
hierarchical Stackelberg equilibrium. Under linear demand and cost functions Boyer
and Moreax (1986), and Vives (1988) showed the existence of the unique Stackel-
berg equilibrium of the hierarchical Stackelberg game by directly computing its so-
lution. Robson (1990) established the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium under
general conditions of demand and cost functions. For the Stackelberg models with
many leaders and followers researchers tackled questions concerning the existence and
uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium. In duopoly case, Okamura, Futagarni, and
Ohkawa (1998) proved that there exists a unique Stackelberg equilibrium under ge-
neral demand and cost functions. The convexity of the follower’s reaction function
is essential for uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium. In cases of a single leader
and multiple followers, Sherall, Soyster and Murphy (1983) showed the existence and
uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium under general demand and cost functions,
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and also that convexity of the reaction function of the follower’s total output with re-
spect to the leader’s output is crucial for the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium.
This paper aims to obtain generalization of closed form solution for a general hie-
rarchical structure of ﬁrms arranged by leaderships into groups which can be modelled
by multi-stage game with perfect information in which sequentially level by level mul-
tiple players (ﬁrms) of each level choose outputs simultaneously and independently,
and multiple followers (ﬁrms) of the next (lower) level of hierarchical structure decide
outputs simultaneously and independently later, given the players’s of the higher level
their total output, and then after all these sequential setting the ﬁrms of the highest
level assigns simultaneously their outputs.
It is worth to note that in the modern market a lot of hierarchical structures arise.
For example, market of operation systems is split mainly between Windows (67.1%)
and Linux (22.8%) meanwhile all the rest operations system takes together 10.1% of
the market. So, in the operation systems markets presets three level hierarchical struc-
ture where the ﬁrst and second levels are occupied by one OS (Windows and Linux)
each meanwhile the third one is shared by all the rest OS. The world market of tobacco
(except China) is split into four levels. The ﬁrst level is shared by Altria (28%) and
British American Tobacco (25%). Japan Tobacco holds the second one (16%). The
third level is split among Imperial Tobacco (6%) and Altadis (3%). All the rest equal
competitors share the fourth level.
When one deals with such hierarchical structures as a ﬁrst approximation one could
consider the produced product as a homogeneous one. Of course, products sold in both
mentioned markets are differentiated. Sure, the importance of product differentiation
is underscored by smokers brand loyalty in the market for tobacco products and by
positive network externalities (stemming from the need of compatibility of an applica-
tion software with an operating system) in the market for operating systems. But as a
ﬁrst and very rough approximation under very strong assumption about homogeneous
nature of the products these markets could be described in frame of Cournot and Stac-
kelberg models. When one starts studying Cournot model even for two ﬁrms presented
on a market, the ﬁrst two usual questions one has to answer are to ﬁnd Cournot-Nash
and Stackelberg equilibria and compare them (Gibbons, 1992). The goal of this paper
is to extend the classical solution in closed form of the Stackelberg model for a general
hierarchicalstructurescomposedbyﬁrmsarrangedintogroupsofdifferenthierarchical
levels acting sequentially level by level and simultaneously inside of a level.
2. Cournot model
In Cournot model of oligopoly there are M ﬁrms producing the same good. Each ﬁrm
i, i ∈ {1,...M} has a constant marginal cost of production ci. Each ﬁrm simultaneously
and independently sets the quantity qi of the good its is going to produce. An inverse
aggregate demand function of p(q)=max{A−q,0}, where q=q1+...+qM, is given.
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Then the following result is a well known (see, for example Gibbons (1992) and we
produce it here only for convenience of the readers.


































For the case with equal production cost ci = c, i ∈ {1,...,M} the equilibrium strategies



















Of course, in Theorem 1 we deal only with conception of interior solution which exists
under assumption that the parameters of the model are such that all the qi given by (2)





cj ≥ Mci for i ∈ {1,...,M}.
3. Stackelberg model
In this section we consider the strong linear hierarchical structure model Leader-Follo-
wer where the number of levels coincides with number of ﬁrms. This kind of Stac-
kelberg model can be solved in the sense of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Without loss of generality we can assume that the ﬁrst level leader is ﬁrm 1, the second
level leader is ﬁrm 2 and so on. Thus, ﬁrm M is the lowest ﬁrm in the hierarchi-
cal structure. The game is played in M stages. On the ﬁrst stage ﬁrm M chooses its
strategy to maximize PM assuming that all the other strategies are ﬁxed. So, since
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 2, no. 3 229A. Galegov, A. Garnaev
¶2PM/¶q2






















So, after substituting qM into (1) for i ∈ {1,...,M−1} we obtain that the payoff to ﬁrm


















qi, i ∈ {1,...,M−1}. (4)
On the second stage, since ¶2PM−1/¶q2
M−1 = −1, ﬁrm M−1 chooses its strategy as















After substituting qM−1 into (4) for i ∈ {1,...,M−2} we obtain that the payoff to ﬁrm


































and so on. Then, step by step ﬁrm M−k, k ∈ {1,...M−2} recursively sets its strategy
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, i ∈ {1,...,M}
Thus, we proved the following result.























for i ∈ {1,...,M}.

















Of course, in Theorem 2 we deal only with conception of interior solution which exists
under assumption that the parameters of the model are such that all the qi given by (5)





2jcM−j ≥ 2Mci for i ∈ {1,...,M}.
It is clear that a ﬁrm increases own production if production cost of its rival is increa-
sing and it reduces own production if its own production cost arises. Namely, qi is
increasing in each cj where j 6= i and qi is decreasing in each ci.
For a particular case with equal production cost ci = c, i ∈ {1,...,M} from Theo-
rem 2 we have the following result.
Theorem 3. For the case with equal production cost ci = c, i ∈ {1,...,M} the equilib-
rium strategies are given as follows
qi =
1




2M+i(A−c)2, i ∈ {1,...,M}.











If the number of ﬁrms with equal production cost c increases then the aggregate output
tends to A−c.
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4. General case
As a general case we consider a hierarchical structure composed by M ﬁrms arranged
into N groups of ﬁrms G1, ..., GN of different hierarchical level such that the groups
Gi composes ith level and consists of Mi ﬁrms. Let Gi = ∪i
j=1Gi, i ∈ {1,...N} and
Mi = å
i
j=1Mi is the number of ﬁrms which are on levels from 1 to i. Then MN = M.







qi−ciqi, i ∈ GN. (6)
Let start stage by stage, level by level from the level N (ﬁrst stage) which is the lowest
one and it is composed by ﬁrms of group GN. Since ¶2Pi/¶q2
i = −2 these ﬁrms set up
their strategies as a solution of the system of equations ¶Pi/¶qi = 0, i ∈ GN or
−2qi+A− å
j∈GN\{i}




















cj, k ∈ {1,...,N}.

















qi, i ∈ GN−1. (8)
Pass on to the next level (the second stage), namely, to the level N −1 composed
by ﬁrms from group GN−1. Since ¶2Pi/¶q2
i = −2/(MN +1) these ﬁrms set up their
strategies as a solution of the system of equations ¶Pi/¶qi = 0 , i ∈ GN−1 where Pi
are given by (8). Then
−2qi+A− å
j∈GN−1\{i}


























(Mk +1) for 1 ≤ s ≤ r ≤ N
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and
Pr
s = 1 for s > r.
Thus, substituting qi from (9) into (8) we obtain the payoffs of the ﬁrms from group




















qi, i ∈ GN−2.
Now, let us pass on to the level M −k composed by ﬁrms of group GN−k. Since
¶2Pi/¶q2
i = −2/PN
N−1 these ﬁrms set up their strategies as a solution of the system of












































qi for i ∈ GN−k−1.



















































ci, i ∈ Gk

















Thus, we proved the following result.
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Theorem 4. In the Stackelberg model with N groups of ﬁrms the equilibrium strategies



























, i ∈ Gk.




















Of course, in Theorem 4 we deal only with conception of interior solution which exists
under assumption that the parameters of the model are such that all the qi given by (10)







1 ci for i ∈ Gk, k ∈ {1,...,N}
For a particular case with equal marginal cost ci = c, i ∈ {1,...,M} from Theorem 2
we have the following result.
Theorem 5. For the case with equal production cost ci = c, i ∈ {1,...,M} in the Stac-












, i ∈ Gk.













In this work we considered the hierarchical structures in general form in the frame
of Cournot-Stackelberg model and constructed the optimal strategies in closed form.
We can apply this closed form solutions to estimate which impact they produce on the
market. As a criteria of such impact we can consider the market price p or the quantity
of the goods (Q = A− p) produced by all the ﬁrms. Then Q is given as follows:
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(iii) In the general case where the hierarchical structure is composed by M ﬁrms

















For example if there are three ﬁrms (M = 3) with marginal cost of production ci, i =
1,2,3 equals 1, 2 and 3, and A=10. Then, Q{1,2,3} =6, Q{1,2},{3} =6.833, Q{1},{2,3} =
7 and Q{1},{2},{3} = 7.375 and the market prices are p{1,2,3} = 4, p{1,2},{3} = 3.167,
p{1},{2,3} = 3 and p{1},{2},{3} = 2.625.
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